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ARGUMENT
L

The Radmans Cannot Demonstrate a Plausible Alternative Interpretation of
the Language of the Merger Agreement.
In their opposition to Flanders' cross-appeal, the Radmans allege that

Section 9 of the Merger Agreement is open to two plausible interpretations, rendering the
agreement ambiguous.1 The Radmans appear to admit that the alleged ambiguity in the
Market Protection Clause is whether "Market Price" means $1.5 million (as the Radmans
claim) or $8 per share. The contract provision at issue (the "Market Protection Clause")
reads as follows:
Pursuant to this Agreement, the GFI Shareholders are receiving 187,502
shares of Flanders Capital Stock as set forth on Exhibit "A" attached
hereto. Since the 187,502 shares of Flanders Capital Stock are restricted
shares, each share has a discounted market value of $8.00 per share, for an
aggregate market price of $1,500,016 (the "Market Price"). If at the time
any of the GFI Shareholders sell any of the 187,502 shares of Flanders
Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average trading
price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital Stock as
listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is below $8.00 per share, Flanders
shall deliver additional restricted shares of Flanders Common Stock to such
GFI Shareholders in order to maintain the Market Price (the "Short Fair),
with such Short Fall shares valued at the Market Price.
[Ex. P-l (emphasis added).]

1

The Radmans also allege that the Agreement is facially unclear. Not only is this
allegation entirely inconsistent with their claim that it is open to plausible interpretations,
but it is unsupported by their argument, which quite clearly identifies the source of the
alleged ambiguity—whether "Market Pricev means $1.5 million or $8 per share.
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Flanders demonstrated in its initial brief that the Market Protection Clause
functions and makes sense as a whole only if "Market Price" is defined as $8 per share.
Under Flanders' interpretation, the last sentence of the clause reads as follows:
If at the time any of the GFI Shareholders sell any of the 187.502 shares of
Flanders Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average
trading price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital
Stock as listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is below $8.00 per share,
Flanders shall deliver additional restricted shares of Flanders Common
Stock to such GFI Shareholders in order to maintain the [value of $8.00 per
share] (the "Short Fall"), with such Short Fall shares valued at [$8.00 per
share].
The Radmans' arguments against this interpretation are unpersuasive as they focus solely
on whether Flanders* interpretation would be a good deal for the Radmans, rather than
whether the clause works under that interpretation. However, the Radmans signed the
Agreement with the language quoted above, and Utah courts "will not make a better
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves." Bakowski v Mountain
States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ^|19, 52 P.3d 1179. Moreover, the Radmans* arguments
are unhelpful, as they ask the Court to pick a side rather than enforce the contract. The
Radmans* "illustration" proves this point. The Radmans point out that, under Flanders*
interpretation, if Flanders* stock dropped to $.02 per share, the Radmans would only have
received $7,491.10. Of course, under the Radmans5 "interpretation" this same
hypothetical situation would result in Flanders having to issue 74,813,298 additional
Short Fall Shares - nearly three times the entire number of outstanding shares of Flanders
common stock. Overnight the Radmans would become the 75% owners of this public
company. The absurdity of this result highlights the uselessness of the Radmans*
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o

arguments. In reality. Flanders' interpretation of the Market Protection Clause is the only
one that is plausible.
This nicely frames the question for the Court—do the Radmans even have a
plausible interpretation of the language used in the Market Protection Clause? The
answer is no. Under the Radmans* purported interpretation, the last sentence of the
clause reads as follows:
If at the time any of the GFI Shareholders sell any of the 187,502 shares of
Flanders Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average
trading price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital
Stock as listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is below $8.00 per share,
Flanders shall deliver additional restricted shares of Flanders Common
Stock to such GFI Shareholders in order to maintain the [value of
$1,500,016] (the "Short Fall"), with such Short Fall shares valued at
[$1,500,016].
The Radmans do not even try to show how the Market Protection Clause could
plausibly function under this interpretation, which is what they are required to show in
order to establish that the provision was ambiguous. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
2006 UT 20, HH15-17, 133 P.3d 428 ("to merit consideration as an interpretation that
creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition 'must be based upon the usual and natural
meaning of the language used and may not be the result of a forced or strained
construction.'" (emphasis added)). Instead, the Radmans' "plausible" interpretation of
the Market Protection Provision makes the clause nonsensical. For example, if only one
of the Radmans sold only 100 shares at $4 per share, which they were entitled to do under
the Agreement, that Radman would have received $400. Under the Radmans'
interpretation, that $400 would be compared to the "Market Value" of $1,500,016,
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O

yielding a Short Fall of $1,499,616, even though the Radmans still held 187,402 shares.
That Short Fall would then be divided by $1,500,016, the "Market Value'* at which the
Short Fall shares were to be valued, resulting in the issuance of .99 shares. Even worse,
if all of the Radmans" shares were sold for nothing, resulting in a $1,500,016 Short Fall,
the Radmans would receive one Short Fall share. Recognizing this absurdity, the
Radmans claim that, because it is nonsense under their interpretation, the language of the
provision should be ignored and entirely rewritten to suit their purposes. The trial court
should not have indulged the Radmans by interpreting ambiguity into the contract just so
that it could be judicially rewritten. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc.,
936 P.2d 1068. 1079 (Utah 1997). Since the Market Protection Clause has only one
plausible interpretation, the one Flanders offered, the trial court erred in holding that it
was ambiguous. The ruling in favor of the Radmans on their claim for breach of contract
should be reversed.
II.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Contract Exceeded the Scope of Its
Power.
The Radmans appear to have missed the point of Flanders" second assignment of

error on cross-appeal. Flanders does not dispute the trial court's factual findings as to the
intentions of the parties, which is why no evidence was marshaled to contradict those
findings. Flanders' sole legal issue with respect to the trial court's interpretation is
whether the trial court exceeded its authority by mandating a particular result rather than
providing an interpretation of the contract language. Nowhere in its findings does the
trial court identify how the language of the Market Protection Clause should be read.
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Instead, the trial court completely scrapped the language used and agreed to by the
parties, and rewrote a provision with terms and calculations not found in the Contract.
This exceeded the trial court's authority, regardless of its factual findings regarding the
parties' intentions. See WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88. f25. 54
P.3d 1139 ("It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous because of a lack of
clarity in the meaning of particular terms, it is subject to parol evidence as to what the
parties intended with respect to those terms." (emphasis added)). This is a legal question
reviewed for correctness, and no marshalling was required. See Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d
9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58,^|17, 7 P.3d 783. Since the
trial court exceeding its authority in the way it approached the interpretation of the
contract, the trial court's ruling must be reversed.
III.

The Trial Court Improperly Ruled That the Radmans Were Co-Prevailing
Parties
This court has quite clearly stated that "[fjhere can be only one prevailing party in

any litigation/' Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, ^[14, 128 P.3d 63. Based on
this Court's holding in Cache County, the trial court's ruling that both parties prevailed
was an error of law that should be remanded to the trial court.
However, the circumstances of this case highlight the need for this Court to
provide some guidance on the "flexible and reasoned" approach first used by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551. 557 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270. In particular, this Court should advise the
217994 l.DOC
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trial court that the "total victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed" analyses are
inappropriate to this case, which involves unspecified consequential damages. The
flexible approach begins (and possibly ends) with the "net judgment rule," pursuant to
which the party awarded the most damages is the prevailing party. See Mountain States,
783 P.2d at 557. If the "net judgment rule" provides a sensible result, the trial court need
not look any further. However, if the trial court is uncertain of the "net judgment rule"
result, it can consider other "common sense perspectives" that it finds applicable to the
case at issue. See Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at ^26.
The Radmans' assert that the "flexible and reasoned approach" requires the Court
to apply the "total victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed" analyses to this case.
Of course, the Utah Supreme Court has not required that, but only held that if the trial
court is uncertain of the "net judgment rule" result, it can consider other "common sense
perspectives" that it finds applicable to the case at issue. See Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at
TJ26. Whipple did not endorse the "total victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed"
analyses in all cases, but merely stated that in the context of Mountain States those
analyses seemed appropriate. See id. However, both the Utah Supreme Court and this
Court have acknowledged that many other approaches may be applicable, depending on
the facts of the particular case. See Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at ^26; Carlson Distrib. Co. v.
Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App 227, f37, 95 P.3d 1171.
The "total victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed" analyses relied upon by
the Radmans only function, and have only been applied, where the parties seek damages
217994_1.DOC
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that are specified in their pleadings. See Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 558;
Occidental/Nebraska Fed Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has only applied those analyses where the parties
sought direct damages that were specified in the pleadings and relatively liquidated in
amount. See Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at ^|26 (foreclosure of mechanics lien). The "total
victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed" analyses worked in Mountain States
because this Court was able to boil the dispute down to how a $30,000 pot of cash should
be split between the parties. See Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 558. Of course, even in
that circumstance, this Court ultimately still decided to use the "net judgment rule." See
id. An attempt to apply the "total victory" and "percentage of amounts claimed" analyses
in this case shows how inappropriate those analyses are where parties assert claims for
unspecified consequential damages.
First, both Flanders and the Radmans sought some direct damages - for Flanders
the purchase price of the electric melters and for the Radmans the uncovered ShortFall
amount. Note that neither party specified in its pleadings the exact amount of even these
direct damages, giving the Court no hard numbers to compare against the ultimate result.
If however, we take the amount of direct damages computed by each party's experts, both
Flanders and the Radmans were awarded all of their direct damages in this case.
Second, both Flanders and the Radmans also sought some consequential damages.
Flanders sought additional repair costs and lost profits in an undeterminate amount. The
Radmans seek to put a $107 million figure on those damages, based upon affidavits from
217994 l.DOC
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Steve Clark as to the damage to Flanders5 market capitalization, among other things.
However, at trial, Flanders' damages expert only testified as to $4 million of
consequential damages. How much, then, did Flanders actually "seek"? On the other
hand, the Radmans initially sought specific performance as an alternative in their
Complaint, asking for the actual shares of Flanders stock that they alleged they were
entitled to. Since the value of Flanders' stock has steadily climbed since April 19, 1999,
this appears to be a claim in the alternative for lost profits from the appreciation of the
Flanders stock, a consequential damage. The amount of lost profits the Radmans were
"seeking" can only be estimated, but one possible estimate is to take the stipulated
damages amount of $547,904.50, at the closing price on April 19, 1999 of $2,875 per
share of Flanders stock, to determine that the Radmans were asking for 190,575
additional shares of Flanders stock. As of November 1, 2005, the closing (immediately
prior to the trial court's hearing on attorneys fees) price of Flanders stock was $10.91 per
share. Under this analysis the Radmans were asking for over $2 million of Flanders
stock, or approximately $1.5 million in lost profits on the shares they requested. The
Radmans did not pursue this claim at trial. Thus, neither party got any of these
consequential damages.
Finally, we can add the direct and consequential damages together. Flanders
sought somewhere in between $5 and $107 million in total damages, and received $1
million, or somewhere from 20% to 1%. The Radmans sought somewhere in the vicinity
of $2 million in total damage. This analysis is completely unhelpful in this case. The
217994 l.DOC
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parties tied on direct damages, recovering 100% each. The parties tied on consequential
damages, recovering 0% each. On a combined basis, the Radmans recovered somewhere
in the 25% range, while Flanders recovered somewhere in the 20% to 1% range. The
trial court is still not provided with any identification of "a clearly successful party that is
genuinely entitled to receive attorney fees." Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at 1J26. The version
of the "flexible and reasoned" approach championed by the Radmans therefore fails in its
purpose of clarifying the identity of the real "prevailing party." This Court should
therefore instruct the trial court to decline to use the Radmans" approach, and apply the
commonly used and easily understood "net judgment rule%* in determining the prevailing
party on remand.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred in critical ways in its interpretation of the Market
Protection Clause, the judgment rendered in favor of the Radmans on their claims should
be reversed, and the trial court's determination that the Radmans were co-prevailing
parties should be reversed.
DATED this _ f t

day of May, 2007.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Waddoups
Jonathan O. Hafen
Michael D. Black
Attorneys for Appellees
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